The US Vice President suggested that differences in media freedom between Washington and the mediators contributed to the delay in publishing the 14-point agreement.

US Vice President JD Vance has drawn attention to Pakistan's press freedom record while explaining why the Trump administration delayed releasing the full text of the recently signed US-Iran peace agreement, known as the "Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding".

Speaking on The New York Times podcast Interesting Times with Ross Douthat, Vance said the administration had intended to publish the agreement earlier but suggested that differences in transparency among the countries involved in the mediation process contributed to the delay.

Question of Political Culture

Responding to questions about the timing of the deal's publication, Vance argued that Pakistan and Qatar, which played key roles in facilitating the agreement, do not have the same constitutional protections for freedom of speech and the press as the United States.

"So first of all, we actually really want to get this out because it's hard to have the conversation without the full text," Vance said. "And I think part of the misalignment here is that in the Pakistani and Qatari systems, they don't quite have the First Amendment and freedom of the press. And so there isn't this expectation that the text is going to be out there for the American people to actually interrogate and look at and analyze and understand for themselves".

The remarks came after days of speculation about the contents of the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, which American officials later disclosed ahead of planned negotiations in Switzerland.

The Islamabad Memorandum

The US and Iran signed the agreement on Wednesday, bringing an end to more than 100 days of conflict in West Asia. Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif was the first to announce on social media that the two sides had reached a ceasefire agreement, which was later named the "Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding".

Pakistan and Qatar both played important roles in facilitating the agreement. According to a senior US official quoted by Bloomberg, discussions with Pakistani authorities and separate private talks with Qatari officials helped Washington better understand Iran's political system and move the negotiations forward. A late intervention by Qatar was reportedly crucial in securing the temporary agreement.

However, uncertainty remained after the announcement because the full text of the 14-point Memorandum of Understanding was not immediately released.

Key Elements of the Deal

Vance highlighted key elements of the agreement, including the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the formal cessation of Iranian military action, which he described as a significant step towards de-escalation.

The interim agreement is aimed at ending the conflict and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, while also restarting negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme. The deal allows Iran to resume unrestricted oil exports, providing an immediate economic benefit. Under the terms, both countries have largely returned to the position they were in before the conflict escalated around three and a half months ago.

Confusion and Diplomatic Delays

The release of the agreement has already been marked by confusion and diplomatic delays. Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif postponed a planned trip to Switzerland for a formal US-Iran peace deal ceremony after the Memorandum of Understanding was signed electronically and entered into force.

Pakistan's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar later confirmed that the Switzerland ceremony had been cancelled because the agreement had already been signed remotely. The uncertainty deepened after Sharif edited an earlier social media post that had referred to Pakistan and Qatar hosting an official ceremony in Switzerland.

Renewed Focus on Pakistan's Press Freedom Record

Vance's comments have renewed focus on Pakistan's standing in international press freedom. Pakistan has long faced criticism from media watchdogs and human rights organisations over restrictions on journalists, pressure on media outlets and legal measures affecting freedom of expression.

The debate has intensified following constitutional and political changes introduced in Pakistan in late 2025, which critics argue reduced institutional checks and weakened judicial oversight. While Pakistani authorities maintain that freedom of expression is protected under the constitution, rights groups continue to raise concerns about the operating environment for journalists and independent media organisations.

Next Phase of Diplomacy

The next phase of diplomacy is expected to begin on Saturday, when US envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi are due to meet in Switzerland for a new 60-day round of negotiations. US President Donald Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, is also reportedly already in Switzerland.

However, the deal has faced an immediate challenge as fighting between Israel and Hezbollah continues in southern Lebanon. The memorandum calls for the termination of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon, and stresses respect for the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Reports of fresh Israeli strikes and Hezbollah rocket attacks have complicated efforts to move forward with negotiations. Planned talks in Switzerland were delayed after Iranian officials declined to travel, insisting that the violence in Lebanon must stop before further discussions can take place.

Pakistan has unexpectedly found itself at the center of a major diplomatic development after Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif publicly announced progress in negotiations between the United States and Iran before any formal declaration from Washington. The move has drawn international attention and fueled debate about whether Islamabad is emerging as a more influential diplomatic player in global affairs.

Sharif announced on June 12 that a final text of a peace agreement between the United States and Iran had been agreed upon and that Pakistan was working closely with both sides to finalize the next steps. Subsequent statements from U.S. and Iranian officials indicated that a framework agreement had indeed been reached, confirming Islamabad's involvement in the mediation effort.

The development is particularly notable because major diplomatic breakthroughs involving Washington are often announced directly by U.S. leaders. In this case, Pakistan's leadership became the first to publicly signal that negotiations had reached a critical stage.

Pakistan's Mediation Role

According to reports, Pakistan has been involved in facilitating communication between Washington and Tehran for several months. The country leveraged its diplomatic relationships across multiple regions, including the United States, Iran, Gulf states, and China, to help maintain dialogue between the two sides.

Reuters reported that Pakistan played a mediating role in helping both countries reach a preliminary agreement aimed at ending hostilities and reopening channels for broader negotiations.

The proposed framework reportedly includes a halt to military operations, reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and a 60-day period of negotiations on Iran's nuclear program and sanctions-related issues. However, several complex matters remain unresolved and will require further discussions.

A Shift in Regional Diplomacy?

For decades, countries such as Qatar, Oman, and, at times, Turkey have often served as intermediaries in sensitive Middle East negotiations. Pakistan has generally remained on the margins of such diplomatic initiatives despite its strategic location and historical ties with key regional actors.

Analysts suggest that Islamabad's involvement in the U.S.-Iran talks could signal a broader effort to reposition itself as a facilitator of dialogue and conflict resolution. Successfully contributing to a breakthrough between two long-standing adversaries could enhance Pakistan's diplomatic credibility and strengthen its international profile.

The development also highlights Islamabad's ability to maintain working relationships with countries that often find themselves on opposite sides of geopolitical disputes.

Challenges Remain

Despite the positive momentum, experts caution against viewing the agreement as a final settlement. The framework is still subject to additional negotiations, and contentious issues such as Iran's nuclear activities, missile capabilities, sanctions relief, and regional security concerns remain unresolved.

Diplomatic observers note that mediators often receive recognition during the negotiation phase but can also face criticism if agreements later collapse. As a result, Pakistan's long-term diplomatic gains may depend on whether the current framework evolves into a durable and enforceable peace arrangement.

Symbolism Beyond the Agreement

Beyond the substance of the negotiations, the optics of the announcement have attracted attention. The fact that Pakistan's prime minister publicly disclosed the breakthrough before Washington underscored Islamabad's visible role in the process and generated discussion about changing diplomatic dynamics in the region.

For Pakistan, the moment represents an opportunity to showcase its diplomatic capabilities on a global stage. Whether it marks the beginning of a sustained role as a regional mediator or remains an isolated success will depend on future developments.

A fresh controversy has emerged in Pakistan’s political discourse after a media report alleged that the removal of former Prime Minister Imran Khan in 2022 was not merely the result of a parliamentary no-confidence motion, but part of a broader geopolitical strategy involving the United States and the Pakistan military establishment.

The report, published by an international media outlet, claims that tensions between Washington and Islamabad escalated after Imran Khan’s visit to Moscow on 24 February 2022, the same day Russia launched its military operation in Ukraine. According to the report, the visit angered the United States, which expected Pakistan to take a clear anti-Russia stance on the conflict. Imran Khan’s government, however, maintained a neutral position on the Russia-Ukraine war, refusing to directly condemn Moscow. This, according to the report, marked a turning point in US-Pakistan diplomatic relations.

The allegations further claim that on 7 March 2022, a key meeting took place in Washington between Pakistan’s then ambassador Asad Majeed Khan and US Assistant Secretary of State Donald Lu. During this interaction, Lu reportedly conveyed that if Imran Khan were removed through a no-confidence vote, the United States would “forgive everything” and restore normal relations. This alleged communication later became central to Pakistan’s domestic political debate and formed the basis of the so-called “Cypher case,” which Imran Khan repeatedly cited as evidence of foreign interference in his removal.

According to the report, a lunch meeting in Washington further intensified pressure, where concerns were raised about Pakistan’s foreign policy direction under Imran Khan. The US side reportedly expressed dissatisfaction with Pakistan’s stance on Russia and warned of diplomatic isolation if policy alignment did not change. The timeline presented in the report suggests that just 33 days after the alleged diplomatic exchange, on 9 April 2022, Imran Khan lost power following a successful no-confidence motion in Pakistan’s parliament. Shortly after, Shehbaz Sharif became the new Prime Minister.

The report also highlights subsequent political developments in Pakistan, suggesting that the country’s internal power structure underwent significant changes after Imran Khan’s removal. These include leadership transitions within the military establishment and increased political instability, including mass protests and legal cases against PTI leadership. In November 2022, Pakistan’s army leadership changed when General Asim Munir replaced General Qamar Javed Bajwa as Chief of Army Staff. Imran Khan has previously alleged that this appointment was politically influenced, though no official confirmation has supported the claim.

In May 2023, Imran Khan was arrested in a corruption case, triggering widespread protests and unrest across the country. The political situation further intensified when his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), faced restrictions and internal fragmentation ahead of the 2024 general elections. Despite electoral setbacks, PTI-backed independent candidates reportedly performed strongly in the polls, but a coalition government was eventually formed by rival parties Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).

The report also suggests that Pakistan’s relations with the United States improved significantly after Imran Khan’s removal. Bilateral cooperation reportedly expanded into strategic, economic and defense-related areas, marking a shift from the earlier strained ties. However, these claims remain politically sensitive and highly contested. The United States has consistently denied allegations of orchestrating regime change in Pakistan, maintaining that the 2022 political transition was an internal constitutional process.

Imran Khan, on his part, has repeatedly maintained that his government was removed due to a foreign-backed conspiracy. He has linked the alleged “Cypher” diplomatic communication to his claim that external pressure played a decisive role in the no-confidence vote. The new report has reignited debate within Pakistan’s political landscape, particularly among supporters of PTI, who argue that the allegations validate long-standing claims of foreign interference. PTI leaders have described the report as further proof supporting their stance on the Cypher controversy.

Imran Khan, who has been in prison since August 2023, continues to face multiple legal cases. He has been convicted in several cases, including the Al-Qadir Trust case and earlier Cypher-related charges, though some convictions have been overturned or suspended by higher courts. As political tensions continue, the narrative surrounding Imran Khan’s ouster remains deeply polarised, reflecting broader divisions within Pakistan’s politics and its complex relationship with global powers.

"Walking on a Very Thin Line With a Deep Abyss on Both Sides"

That is how Pakistani journalist and anchor Asma Shirazi described her country's position in the Iran-Saudi Arabia-US-Israel war that has consumed the Middle East since February 28, 2026. It is perhaps the most precise summary possible of an impossible strategic situation — one that Pakistan signed itself into with a single pact in September 2025, without quite imagining it would be tested this fast, this hard, or in these circumstances.

In one corner: Iran — a 900-kilometre shared border, millions of Pakistani Shia citizens who venerate the Khamenei they just watched be assassinated, a Balochistan province already a tinderbox, and a neighbour that can stoke separatism, sectarian violence and proxy activity with considerable experience and incentive.

In the other corner: Saudi Arabia — four million Pakistani workers whose remittances keep a structurally fragile economy from collapsing, decades of petrodollar lifelines, a nuclear defence pact signed just six months ago that explicitly states any aggression against either country is aggression against both, and a relationship described by one analyst as placing Pakistan "under the nuclear umbrella."

Pakistan cannot stand with both. It cannot afford to abandon either. And time is running out to avoid being forced to choose.

The Pact That Changed Everything

When Pakistan signed a mutual defence pact with Saudi Arabia in September 2025, it likely did not expect a US-Israel war against Iran to test it so soon. Now Islamabad's credibility could be on the line.

The crisis represents the first serious geopolitical test of the pact, signed during Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif's state visit to Riyadh. Although the agreement was presented as a framework for defence cooperation, its core clause carries potentially far-reaching implications: aggression against one is treated as aggression against both.

The ambiguity was deliberate. Both Riyadh and Islamabad wanted a pact strong enough to deter Iranian aggression, but flexible enough to avoid locking Pakistan into a military commitment it could not honour. As Joshua White of the Brookings Institution observed: "You can't have deterrence without some constructive ambiguity." The pact was engineered precisely so that both parties retained room to manoeuvre.

Then Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar spent that ambiguity in a single press conference.

The Dar Press Conference: When Words Became a Tripwire

On March 3, Dar publicly told reporters that Islamabad might have to join the Iran war because of the Saudi mutual defence pact — warning Tehran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi directly not to attack Saudi Arabia and invoking the agreement explicitly: "I made them understand that we have a defence agreement."

Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Mohammad Asif went even further, appearing to confirm that Pakistan's nuclear capabilities "will be made available to Saudi Arabia according to this agreement" — before walking the statement back entirely to Reuters the following day. That contradiction is not a diplomatic mishap. It is a window into the impossible position Islamabad now occupies.

Dar's public invocation of the defence pact was intended to raise the cost of Iranian aggression against Saudi Arabia. Instead, it has raised the cost of Pakistani inaction to a level Islamabad may be unable to pay. He sounded less like a man laying down a tripwire than one hoping no one would test it — and in doing so may have ensured someone will.

The Iran Problem: A Border Pakistan Cannot Afford to Inflame

Pakistan shares a 900-kilometre long and porous border with Iran in its southwest. The two countries maintain significant trade ties and have recently stepped up diplomatic engagement — Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Islamabad as recently as August 2025.

The domestic dimension is equally urgent. Members of Pakistan's large Shia community took to the streets to protest against Khamenei's killing — among them Nida Afzal, a political activist from Lahore who described Iran as "one of the very few countries that does not believe in American hegemony."

Security analyst Amir Rana of the Pak Institute of Peace Studies warned: "Iran has significant influence over Shia organisations in Pakistan. And then you have Balochistan, which is already a highly volatile area. If there is any confrontation, the fallout for Pakistan would be severe.

Analysts warn that fighters hardened in Syria's civil war could, if Iran's conflict with Pakistan's Gulf partners deepens, shift from a defensive to an offensive posture on Pakistani soil — adding a militant dimension to the already combustible sectarian and separatist pressures in Balochistan.

The Saudi Problem: An Economy That Cannot Survive Without Riyadh

The financial dimension of Pakistan's dilemma is as binding as the military one.

More than four million Pakistanis work in the Gulf and remit billions of dollars annually — providing a vital cushion for Pakistan's depleted foreign exchange reserves. Beyond these transfers, Saudi Arabia has frequently stabilised Pakistan's recurring economic crises with central bank deposits, deferred oil payments, and ambitious investment pledges.

In 1998, when then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif needed cover to conduct a nuclear bomb test in the face of certain Western sanctions, it was Saudi Arabia that provided 50,000 barrels of oil a day, free of charge, to cushion the blow. Pakistani troops guarded Saudi Arabia's northern border during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. A former Pakistani army chief commands a Saudi-led counterterrorism force in Riyadh today.

This is not an alliance of convenience. It is decades of deep structural interdependence — military, financial and strategic. Abandoning it would not just damage a relationship. It would destabilise Pakistan's economy at its most vulnerable point.

The Quiet Diplomacy That May Be Working — For Now

Amid the public contradictions, Pakistan has been playing a quieter and arguably more effective role as a backchannel between the two sides.

On March 6, Saudi Arabia confirmed it had intercepted three ballistic missiles targeting Prince Sultan Air Base. Hours later, Field Marshal Asim Munir was in Riyadh meeting Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, where they discussed Iranian attacks and "measures needed to halt them within the framework" of their mutual defence pact.

Ayesha Siddiqa, a London-based Pakistani defence analyst, argued that Saudi Arabia appeared "reluctant to become directly involved in the conflict despite Iranian strikes on its territory" — and therefore has been asking Islamabad to convey the message to Tehran not to attack Saudi soil, as the kingdom is not involved in the conflict.

On March 5, Iran's ambassador to Saudi Arabia welcomed the kingdom's pledge not to allow its airspace or territory to be used during the ongoing war — a pledge that Pakistani back-channel diplomacy reportedly helped to secure and formalise.

Dar himself pointed to this: "You can compare that the least attacks from Iran are against Saudi Arabia and Oman," he said, suggesting that Pakistan's diplomatic engagement has already shaped Iranian targeting decisions.

The Two-Front Problem: Afghanistan Makes Everything Worse

Pakistan's strategic position is not just a bilateral Iran-Saudi dilemma. It is a multi-front crisis.

Pakistan's government, already mobilised due to the 2026 Afghanistan-Pakistan war, has been deeply concerned about cross-border clashes in Balochistan, spillover effects, sectarian tensions, or proxy and terrorist activity from its western borders with Iran becoming unstable — which would risk a two-front war it cannot afford and that could negatively affect its eastern border with India.

Pakistan's military is already busy dealing with terrorism related to Afghanistan. Managing military attention across multiple fronts simultaneously — Afghanistan, a potential Iranian border flare-up, domestic Shia unrest and the permanent India border commitment — creates a resource and strategic challenge of extraordinary complexity.

What Pakistan Will Actually Do

The honest answer is: as little as it can for as long as possible.

Most analysts view limited support to Saudi Arabia — intelligence-sharing, naval patrols in the Arabian Sea, or technical air defence cooperation — as far more realistic than a full military deployment. Some suggest a full deployment is possible only in the most extreme circumstances. Dainikjagranmpcg

Professor Ilhan Niaz of Quaid-e-Azam University said that if Saudi Arabia feels sufficiently threatened to formally request Pakistani military assistance, "Pakistan will come to Saudi Arabia's aid" — adding that "to do otherwise would undermine Pakistan's credibility." But the complicating factor, he acknowledged, is that Pakistan cannot afford to treat Iran simply as an adversary.

As journalist Asma Shirazi concluded: "It is like a bridge that Pakistan must cross. Pakistan is walking on a very thin line with a deep abyss on both sides."

What This Means for India

Pakistan's dilemma has direct implications for India. A Pakistan dragged into an active military commitment in the Gulf diverts military attention and resources westward. A Pakistan with an inflamed Balochistan and Shia unrest creates instability on India's northwestern flank. A Pakistan caught between two major Muslim powers while simultaneously managing an Afghanistan war is a Pakistan less capable of maintaining the controlled confrontation that defines the India-Pakistan relationship.

None of these scenarios are straightforwardly good or bad for India's strategic position — they are simply the landscape of a region in which every crisis connects to every other.

Bottom Line

Pakistan signed a defence pact with Saudi Arabia in September 2025 assuming it would serve as a deterrent that would never need to be activated. Six months later, Iran is firing missiles at Aramco refineries, Field Marshal Munir is in Riyadh, and Islamabad's Foreign Minister is invoking the pact in public press conferences.

The tightrope is real. The abyss on both sides is real. And Pakistan's room to keep walking without falling is narrowing with every Iranian missile that crosses a Gulf border.

Pakistan's cricket team kicked off their T20I series against Australia with a gritty 20-run victory at Lahore's Gaddafi Stadium on January 30, 2026. But the real fireworks happened off the field. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif's congratulatory tweet calling it an "electrifying" win has gone viral—for all the wrong reasons. Shehbaz Sharif trolled online as fans and Indian cricket legends like Aakash Chopra and Ajay Jadeja piled on the mockery.

Pakistan's Series Opener: A Solid Start

Batting first, Pakistan posted 170 runs, powered by a strong middle-order show. Australia fell short chasing the target, handing Pakistan a morale-boosting win. PM Shehbaz Sharif wasted no time tweeting his praise: "Well done Team Pakistan for an electrifying performance against Australia in the first T20I. I also appreciate Chairman PCB @MohsinnaqviC42 and his entire team for their tireless efforts in strengthening Pakistan cricket. Proud moment for the nation."

The post aimed to rally national pride ahead of ICC T20 World Cup 2026, where Pakistan faces the Netherlands on February 7 at Sri Lanka's SSC. But in cricket-crazy South Asia, timing and context matter.

Aakash Chopra, Ajay Jadeja Mock the 'Proud Moment'

Indian commentator Aakash Chopra didn't hold back. Replying sharply, he wrote: "With due respect…it’s a bilateral T20I against Australia’s B team. Many main players have given it a miss. And a 20-run win in a 170 run game can’t possibly qualify as ‘electrifying’ 🫣." His take highlighted Australia's depleted squad, turning the PM's hype into comic relief.

Ajay Jadeja joined the fun: "Pakistani-yo ki choti choti Khushiya 😄. First time seeing a PM's tweet after winning the 1st match of a bilateral series 😂. Carry on Sir 😆." The jabs struck a chord, amplifying the buzz on X (formerly Twitter).

Fans Flood Social Media with Trolling

Shehbaz Sharif trolled reached fever pitch as Pakistani and Indian fans unleashed memes and sarcasm. Comments ranged from "Electrifying? Lights went out in Lahore!" to "PM celebrating B-team win like World Cup final." The frenzy underscores cricket's role in Indo-Pak rivalry, especially with Pakistan T20I win Australia fueling World Cup hype.

Why now? As ICC T20 World Cup 2026 nears, every match feels like a statement. Pakistan eyes redemption after recent struggles, but over-the-top reactions risk overshadowing real progress under PCB chief Mohsin Naqvi.

What This Means for Pakistan Cricket

This viral moment offers takeaways: Leaders should match words to context in high-stakes cricket. For fans, it's a reminder to celebrate wins without hype overload. Pakistan shifts to World Cup prep—can they channel this energy positively?