With India facing a two-front nuclear threat—Pakistan’s 170 warheads and China’s 600—experts argue that New Delhi must review its “No First Use” (NFU) doctrine and consider resuming tests to restore credible minimum deterrence.
Trump’s Bombshell and the Underground Arms Race
Trump alleged that adversaries are exploiting deep-underground testing, producing only “minor vibrations” undetectable by global monitors. “They are being done deep underground,” he stated, pointedly omitting India, Israel, and Iran from his list. U.S. Energy Secretary later clarified that America would limit itself to “non-critical” subcritical tests and computer simulations. Yet Trump neither retracted his core claim nor denied potential U.S. resumption—echoing Cold War logic where power, not treaties, guaranteed peace.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed but not ratified by the U.S. and China, remains legally non-binding. Russia de-ratified it in 2023. North Korea conducted the 21st century’s only declared test in 2006. Meanwhile, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) failed to curb proliferation—India and Pakistan rejected it, securing sanctions in 1998 after Pokhran-II.
India’s Strategic Vulnerability
India’s arsenal stands at 180 warheads, per SIPRI estimates—formidable yet dwarfed by China’s triad of land, sea, and air delivery systems. Pakistan’s focus on tactical nuclear weapons like the Nasr missile threatens battlefield escalation, especially along the LoC. If Islamabad is indeed refining low-yield devices clandestinely, India risks technological obsolescence.
Pokhran-II’s credibility remains under scrutiny. The 45-kiloton thermonuclear device reportedly achieved only partial fusion yield, as revealed by DRDO’s K. Santhanam and BARC’s P.K. Iyengar. Without fresh empirical data, India relies on supercomputer simulations—adequate for maintenance but insufficient for next-generation MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle) warheads needed to penetrate China’s growing missile defenses.
Opportunity or Sanctions Trap?
Realists argue that nuclear tests assure peace through mutually assured destruction—witness the Cold War’s absence of World War III. If the U.S. resumes testing to counter China, India could secure Washington’s tacit support via back-channel diplomacy. Transparent tests under IAEA oversight could minimize sanctions while signaling resolve.
Yet economic risks loom. The 2008 Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal hinged on India’s testing moratorium. Resuming explosions could jeopardize Westinghouse and EDF reactor projects critical for India’s 2030 energy goals. Western sanctions in 1998 crippled ISRO and DRDO; a repeat would derail India’s $5 trillion economy ambition.
Doctrine Under Review?
India’s NFU policy—massive retaliation against any nuclear first strike—assumes survivable second-strike capability. China officially endorses NFU; Pakistan does not, reserving first-use against existential conventional threats. Recent Indian statements, including former NSA Shivshankar Menon’s 2016 book, suggest conditional NFU: pre-emptive strikes if intelligence confirms imminent nuclear attack.
The Path Forward
India must prioritize diplomatic outreach to the U.S., framing resumed testing as essential to counterbalance China’s 600-warhead arsenal. Investing in hypersonic delivery, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and MIRVs offers deterrence without immediate tests. Yet clinging to a 1998-vintage arsenal risks strategic irrelevance.
As Trump tears up the post-Cold War nuclear taboo, India faces a stark choice: remain a restrained power or reclaim Pokhran’s audacity. In international politics, the only guarantee of peace is power—and power untested is power doubted.
